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Abstract
Distributed security models based on a ‘web of trust’
eliminate single points of failure and alleviate performance
bottlenecks. However, such distributed approaches rely on
the ability to find trust paths between participants, which
introduces performance overhead. It is therefore of impor-
tance to develop trust path discovery algorithms that min-
imize such overhead. Since peer-to-peer (P2P) networks
share various characteristics with the web of trust, P2P
search algorithms can potentially be exploited to find trust
paths. In this paper we systematically evaluate the appli-
cation of P2P search algorithms to the trust path discov-
ery problem. We consider the number of iterations required
(as expressed by the TTL parameter) as well as the mes-
saging overhead, for discovery of single as well as multi-
ple trust paths. Since trust path discovery does not allow
for resource replication (usual in P2P applications), we ob-
serve that trust path discovery is very sensitive to parame-
ter choices in selective forwarding algorithms (such as K-
walker), but is relatively fast when the underlying network
topology is scale-free.
1. Introduction
The effectiveness and efficiency of any commercial in-
teraction depends strongly on the level of trust that exists
∗Supported by CNPq. This works was conducted while the first author
was in the School of Computing Science at Newcastle University, UK.
†Supported in part by EPSRC grant EP/C009797/1 “Dynamic Operat-
ing Policies for Commercial Hosting Environments” and EU Network of
Excellence grant 026764 “Resilience for Survivability in IST”.
between involved parties. Trust determines if parties are
willing to depend on each other, even if negative conse-
quences are possible [19], and without it, commercial trans-
actions will be inefficient because of doubts about pay-
ments, ability to deliver a service, etc. Trust establishment
in real life is usually a complex and subjective process, and
in electronic commerce, trust establishment arguably be-
comes even more challenging [19]. The absence of human
interaction and the frequency and speed with which new
electronic commerce interactions can be established con-
tribute to this challenge.
Several automated trust solutions have been proposed in
the literature and some are in common use, such as, X.509
[11], PGP [31] and SPKI/SDSI [7, 22]. These solutions pro-
vide ways of determining and assuring that information is
being exchanged with a trusted source. Of particular inter-
est in large scale deployment of trust solutions is the notion
of a web of trust. In a web of trust each party has the abil-
ity to express their trust in entities and communicate this to
other parties (by signing messages). By association, these
other parties may decide to trust the entities as well. Web
of trust solutions are in contrast to the traditional model that
relies on the trust in central entities, namely the Certifica-
tion Authorities (CA).
The literature discusses trust relation creation and man-
agement extensively [14, 25, 26, 28], and the PGP and
SPKI/SDSI standard proposals discuss the concept of trust
paths as well. Recently, various authors have proposed al-
gorithms for discovering trust paths [2, 6, 24] to fill the void
left by the standards (which purposely do not specify how
trust paths should be discovered), but no experimental or
simulation results have been presented to study the effec-
tiveness and performance of the algorithms.
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Trust path discovery is equivalent to finding paths in
undirected graphs (we make this precise in Section 2). To
be of practical value, a trust path discovery algorithm must
take into account that participants are only aware of their di-
rect neighbours. This immediately suggests that P2P search
algorithms may be applicable to this domain, as also real-
ized in [2, 6, 24]. After all, in P2P networks each node
keeps track of a partial index with a subset of all nodes of
the network. In this paper we therefore evaluate how exist-
ing P2P algorithms perform when applied to the trust path
discovery problem.
There exist important differences between traditional
P2P applications and the web of trust. In particular, in a
typical P2P application (such as file sharing), files will be
replicated across peers, thus allowing for tremendous scal-
ing. In the web of trust, however, a trust relationship will
be present only in the two nodes that compose the trust re-
lationship. Replication is possible in some settings (as we
will explain in Section 2), but will be far less prevalent and
straightforward than in traditional P2P applications. As a
consequence, our simulation results will show that an un-
derlying scale-free network topology performs relatively
well for the trust path discovery problem compared to re-
source discovery in traditional P2P applications (as reported
in [8, 17, 30]). Furthermore, we will see that the perfor-
mance of the search algorithms is extremely sensitive to pa-
rameter choices in modified flooding algorithms that limit
the amount of forwarding (such as selective querying and
K-walker).
2. Trust Path Discovery Problem
In abstract terms, the web of trust can be seen as a graph,
where the nodes are participants and the arcs denote trust
(an arc from A to B denotes that A trusts B). In terms of
PGP, one can restate this as nodes being keys and arcs be-
ing signatures that signify trust, e.g., [21]. Arcs can be
uni-directional or bi-directional, since the trust relationship
could be one-way or two-way. For instance, in the X.509
model the users trust in the Certificate Authorities but the
inverse is not true. Thus, in this case we have a one-way
trust relationship. In PGP and SPKI model each princi-
pal can be the issuer or the subject of a trust relationship,
amounting to a two-way trust relationship. Such two-way
relations can be implemented through various mechanisms,
for example through exchange of two signed certificates. In
this paper we assume the PGP and SPKI model, in which
trust relations are bi-directional, i.e., the underlying graph
is undirected.
In a web of trust, if there is no trust relation between two
parties A and C, they can still trust each other if there ex-
ists at least one path between A and C in the graph (we will
call A the origin, and C the target in what follows). That
is, we exploit the fact that trust can be said to be transi-
tive [3, 15]: if A trusts B, and B trusts C, then A trusts C.
The trust path discovery problem then is to find at least one
trust path between two given principals. Discovering such a
path is complicated because each node has only knowledge
about its own trust relations. This suggests, however, that
unstructured P2P search algorithms are natural candidates
to solve the trust path discovery problem.
2.1. P2P networks
There are two categories of decentralized P2P networks:
unstructured, such as Gnutella [10], and structured, such as
those based on a distributed hash table [23, 27]. We will
discuss trust path discovery only for unstructured approach,
since we found that the mapping of a web of trust on a struc-
tured P2P network does not seem to provide any benefits
for discovering trust paths. In traditional P2P networks, one
would search for ‘resources’. When searching trust paths
the ‘resources’ a node contains are the trust relationships it
knows about. In the default setting, each node only knows
about its own trust relationships, and thus in the underlying
P2P network each node is connected to the nodes it trusts.
Discovering a trust path between A and B then is identical
to A querying for a resource that is only present at B.
To find resources (such as files) in unstructured P2P net-
works, each query is propagated through the network by
flooding. For instance, in the original version of Gnutella
[10] a node receiving or generating a query forwards it to a
fixed number of neighbours (typically four). These neigh-
bours forward it to their neighbours, and so on until the mes-
sage time to live (TTL) threshold (typically seven) has been
exceeded. Flooding can directly be applied to the problem
of discovering trust paths. If existing, trust paths will be
discovered using exhaustive flooding.
Flooding has an obvious disadvantage, namely that many
query messages may be needed to find a resource. When
establishing trust paths, this problem is magnified by the
fact that there is no replication of resources (i.e., trust re-
lationships) across multiple nodes. Several variations and
modifications of straightforward flooding have been pro-
posed for traditional P2P networks. Depth-first search was
used in [5, 8, 17], and breadth-first search with increment-
ing message time to live values was proposed and analysed
in [13, 29, 30]. In the Kazaa network [16] the concept of
super-nodes (or ultra-peers) was introduced to create a hi-
erarchical structure in the network, where queries are prop-
agated on a super-nodes overlay that acts like shortcuts be-
tween distant principals. An improvement important for the
problem of trust path discovery is that of caching ‘hits’. In
these solutions a “queryHit” message is created when a de-
sired trust path is found, and this message is propagated in
the reverse path. Subsequent queries then can immediately
2
use the cached result. This approach is very beneficial for
discovering trust paths, and we will evaluate it below.
3. Experiment Setup
3.1. Trust Path Discovery Algorithms
We will compare the following trust path discovery algo-
rithms, which all are variations of flooding in unstructured
P2P networks. For the evaluation of these approaches in the
context of file sharing and similar applications, we refer to,
e.g., [5, 8, 13, 17, 30].
K-walker. In K-walker every node propagates the query
to K randomly selected neighbour nodes, resulting in
a variation of breadth-first search.
Selective querying. Selective querying works like K-
walker, but a query will be propagated through the K
best nodes according to some specific criterion, for in-
stance, location, bandwidth, number of neighbours, re-
sults in previous queries, etc. In trust path discovery,
it seems logical to select nodes with the most neigh-
bours, since this implies these nodes contain more trust
relationships.
Expanding ring. The expanding ring approach repeatedly
increments the message time to live (TTL) until the
trust path is found. Initially the search starts with a
small value of TTL (expressed in terms of the num-
ber of hops) and if the search does not succeed the
TTL value will be increased and the same query will be
sent. This process repeats itself until some pre-defined
maximum value for TTL is reached. The reasoning
behind the expanding ring approach is that it avoids
the problem that if a resource is found but TTL has
not been reached, unnecessary messages continue to
be forwarded.
Ultra-peers. The ultra-peer approach introduces a hierar-
chy between nodes. When a leaf node joins the net-
work it associates itself with one or more ultra-peers
(super-nodes). In the context of trust paths, each ultra-
peer stores information about trust relationships of its
leaf nodes. The search started by a leaf node will
be propagated only in the ultra-peer layer, since these
nodes already know about the trust relations the leaf
nodes provide. It is important to note that introduc-
ing a node hierarchy is against the philosophy of the
web of trust, in which all nodes are equal. However,
one can imagine cases in which ultra-peers naturally
arise (for instance in the shape of CAs), and we there-
fore study the ultra-peer performance and efficiency as
well.
Cache table. In the cache table approach, each node in the
network has a cache table that stores references about
previous successful searches. If the same target is used
again, the path will be found faster. The cache table
can be used with any of the above algorithms, but in
our experiments we only study it in combination with
Gnutella-like flooding.
3.2. Topologies
The topology of a P2P network heavily influences the
effectiveness of various algorithms. The topology is deter-
mined by the number of neighbours each node knows about
(the degree of a node), and in our study we consider two
classes of topologies: the random graph and the scale free
or power law graph [1].
There exist different variations of random graphs and
various approaches to generating random graphs. We use
one of the standard approaches provided by Peersim (see
below), namely one that generates for each node a fixed
number d of edges, and then connects these edges with d
randomly selected neighbouring nodes. Since our simula-
tions use undirected graphs, this results in an average degree
of 2d for each node. Figure 1(a) shows (using logarithmic
scale) the number of nodes with a certain degree, where the
average degree for a node is 4. In the simulation, we gen-
erated random graphs with up to 20,000 nodes, and average
degree 4.
Scale free graphs follow the power law distribution
where many nodes have few connections and few nodes
have many connections. This kind of distribution represents
the small world concept [18] observed in several different
areas, including in the web of trust [4] and traditional P2P
file-sharing applications [9]. We use the Barabasi-Albert
approach [1] to generate scale free graphs (using the imple-
mentation provided in Peersim, see below). Again, we set
the average degree to 4. An example of the degree of nodes
in the resulting graph is given in Figure 1(b).
Peersim - A P2P Simulator. We used the P2P net-
work simulator Peersim [20] to carry out the discrete-event
simulations. Peersim is implemented in Java; it gener-
ates networks according to several possible topology classes
(including random and scale-free topologies) and has a
discrete-event simulator. The simulation execution scales
very well when using Peersim’s ‘cycle-based’ approach,
which ignores certain transport layer elements and concur-
rency, as recommended in [12]. Using Peersim’s Java API,
various P2P algorithms can be very quickly implemented
and evaluated. The simulation runs for which we present
results in the next section typically lasted on the order of
(tens of) seconds.
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Figure 1. Distribution of trust relations (‘links’) per node in different network topologies.
4. Results
There are a number of metrics one may want to consider
when establishing the quality of a trust path discovery algo-
rithm. In this section, we will first discuss the cost of es-
tablishing a single trust path, and then multiple trust paths.
(The latter may be important because the existence of mul-
tiple trust paths may increase the trust level the origin as-
sociates with the target.) The cost we consider is the num-
ber of messages passed over the network to find the trust
path(s). We will also analyse the sensitivity of the results
with respect to the TTL value, which is a critical parameter
that needs to be set in all algorithms. Moreover, in absence
of a notion of time in our simulation, the minimum required
TTL may also be used as an indicator of the time it will take
to find the trust paths. As we mentioned above, the simu-
lation is based on graphs with 20,000 nodes for both the
random and scale free graph topology, with average node
degree 4. We ran simulations with three different distances
from the (arbitrary chosen) origin node: closest (that is, two
hops), average and farthest node from the origin node. For
the random topology, the distances were as follows: av-
erage is 7 hops and farthest is 10 hops; for the scale free
topology: average is 4 hops and farthest is 6 hops. In our
simulations, for all algorithms, TTL was incremented from
2 until 7, and sometimes increased higher to observe spe-
cific phenomena. For the algorithms selective querying and
K-walker we chose three different values for the number of
neighbours to which the query will be propagated: 10%,
50% and 70%. In the ultra-peers algorithm the number of
super-nodes in the network was chosen randomly, selecting
the most connected nodes.
Discovery of the first trust path. Table 1 and Table 2
show the number of trust paths found, for different values
of TTL, for the random ad scale-free topology, respectively.
The graphs in Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the number of
messages propagated through the network for each algo-
rithm, for different values of TTL. We can see in Figure
2 and Figure 3 that both the network topology and the spe-
cific algorithm have an important influence on the number
of messages propagated. In scale free networks some nodes
have a high number of neighbours, resulting in more mes-
sages in the network when flooding techniques are used.
Moreover, these messages can be redundant, because they
forward a query to a node that earlier received that same
query (see [17] for an in-depth discussion). However, Table
1 and Table 2 demonstrate the benefit of this higher num-
ber of messages in the scale-free topology: the trust path
is found within only a few hops for all algorithms. More
precisely, the trust path is found in the minimum number
of hops (TTL=3 for a target 4 hops away), except for K-
walker with 10% forwarding. In the random graph, trust
paths are not always found for low values of TTL. The min-
imum possible value of the TTL is 6 for a target at the av-
erage distance of 7 hops, but algorithms that do not forward
to a high number of neighbours require higher TTL values.
Table 1 shows this number in the bottom row: to find the
first trust path K-walker with 50% requires a TTL value of
11, and K-walker wit 10% needs TTL value 32. Moreover,
selective forwarding with 10% never reaches the target (at
least not for a reasonable TTL value), as indicated in Table
1 by the term ‘none’.
If one is interested in the number of messages used to
find the first trust path, one combines the above-mentioned
figures and tables. For the scale free topology, the Selective
and K-walker algorithms with only 10% forwarding work
best, using only 178 and 425 messages, respectively. For
comparison, the original flooding (Gnutella) method would
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TTL Gnutella K-walker Selective Ultra-peers
original cacheTable 10% 50% 70% 10% 50% 70%
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 2
7 3 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 3
first hit TTL=32 TTL=11 none TTL=10
Table 1. Number of trust paths found for random graph topology for different TTL values. Target is 7
hops away. Bottom line indicates required TTL value to find at least one path.
TTL Gnutella K-walker Selective Ultra-peers
original cache 10% 50% 70% 10% 50% 70%
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 3
4 4 19 0 3 2 1 2 3 7
5 4 95 0 3 3 1 2 3 9
6 5 138 1 4 4 1 3 3 10
7 5 180 1 5 5 1 3 3 11
Table 2. Number of trust paths found for scale free topology for different TTL values. Target is 4 hops
away.
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generate close to 4000 messages before it finds the first path.
For the random graph, Selective and K-walker still outper-
form flooding, but only if the forwarding is at a high level
(70%). To illustrate this, flooding uses about 2700 mes-
sage to find the first trust path, and K-walker with 10% and
50% require as many or more: 2200 and 9000, respectively
(the latter numbers are not visible in Figure 2 because they
require higher values of TTL than displayed there). How-
ever, K-walker with 70% and Selective with 50 and 70%
require less than 1000 messages. In other words, we notice
extreme sensitivity to the chosen amount of forwarding in
the K-walker as well as Selective querying algorithm.
If we compare the above findings with for instance [17],
where networks of similar size were simulated, we note that
the main difference is the lack of replication of the target
in our setting. Hence, the conclusion drawn in [17] that
scale-free topologies should be avoided does not necessar-
ily hold for discovering trust paths. We find that the amount
of messages needed to find the first trust path is similar
for both topologies, and is very sensitive to specific para-
meter choices such as the K value in K-walker. However,
trust paths can be found for low values of TTL in scale-free
topologies–this indicates that the time it takes to discover a
trust path will be less for the scale-free topology, and this
also indicates that the expanding ring approach will work
well for the scale-free topology.
Performance of individual algorithms. The distributed
flooding algorithm (labelled ‘Gnutella’ in figures and ta-
bles) is known to be expensive in terms of the amount of
messages used, and certainly for the scale-free topology our
results confirm this insight. Instead, it is better to limit the
number of forwarded messages using selective or K-walker
with values as low as 10% (as long as the topology is scale-
free). Flooding with caching (‘Gnutella + Cache’) did not
differ much from Gnutella, except in terms of the number of
paths found, a result we discuss in more detail below. We
obtained the results for the caching algorithm as follows.
We conducted several consecutives searches using the same
origin and target nodes. The values obtained with the first
search were cached. In the second search each node that has
the trust path to the target in its cache will reply with this
answer. The same query was repeated until every neigh-
bour of the source node obtained cached results. In our test
environment we needed four consecutive queries, at which
moment we obtained the results presented in the tables and
figures.
As we mentioned above, selective querying or K-walker
algorithms are natural alternatives for flooding, typically
outperforming it. However, selective querying proves a
more stable solution, in that K-walker can lead to very poor
and hard to predict results in terms of the number of mes-
sages needed. To find one trust path with K = 50% in the
random graph topology leads to a worst case scenario (9000
messages, quadruple the number needed by Gnutella). In
our simulation, selective querying forwards to the nodes
with the higher number of neighbours (as opposed to the
randomly selected neighbours in K-walker), and that pays
off in the random graph topology as well.
The ultra-peers algorithm in the random graph topology
uses an amount of message very similar to the Gnutella pro-
tocol. However, in scale free graphs this algorithm got su-
perior results, with trust paths found in as little as 15 mes-
sages. The reason for this is that we select the nodes with
the highest number of neighbours as ultra peers, a fact that
hardly helps if the topology is random, but works very well
in the scale-free case.
In a practical implementation one needs a mechanism to
increase the TTL value using expanding rings (or use one
of the more advanced suggestions in [17]). The results for
expanding ring are the sum of the results for individual TTL
values. Therefore, it is important that an algorithm finds the
trust path for a low value of TTL. In that respect, the results
for the scale-free topology compare favourably to those for
the random topology. So, even though selective forwarding
to 50% of the neighbours in the random topology, with TTL
equal to 32 may require as little as 200 messages, following
the expanding ring approach the search would have to be
repeated for increasing TTL values, thus proving costly af-
ter all. The scale-free topology, on the other hand, requires
only few iterations in the expanding ring approach because
the TTL needed is low.
Discovery of multiple trust paths. One can argue that
if multiple trust paths to the target are known, one can place
more trust in the target. How to quantify trust as a function
of the number of paths is beyond the scope of this paper,
but it is of interest to study the performance of the various
algorithms when multiple paths should be found. Figure 4
shows for the scale-free topology the number of messages
needed to discover multiple paths. We see that the algo-
rithms differ little except for the cached and ultra-peer vari-
ants. It seems that when multiple paths need to be found, we
come closer to a situation of exhaustive search throughout
the network, at which time the chosen algorithm becomes
unimportant. It therefore seems inevitable that hierarchical
or caching solutions are implemented if the objective is to
find more than one trust path to targets.
5. Conclusions
P2P search algorithms are obvious candidates for dis-
covering trust paths in the web of trust, and we therefore
present in this paper a performance comparison between
P2P search algorithms when applied to the trust path dis-
covery problem. From our experiments we conclude that
the algorithms perform relatively well for a scale-free net-
work topology, especially when compared to traditional file
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sharing applications, and we argued that the reason for this
is that replication of resources has no counterpart in trust
path discovery. We also saw that in trust path discovery
the performance of restrictive forwarding algorithms such
as K-walker can be extremely sensitive to the value of K,
the amount of nodes to which a query is forwarded. Fur-
thermore, we obtained results that indicate that when one
is interested in discovering multiple trust paths, most al-
gorithms become prohibitively expensive and instead ultra-
peer or caching alternatives need to be explored.
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